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K MART V. CARTIER: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES THE
GRAY MARKET PROBLEM
R. RICHARD HoPP*
I.
In 1921 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel.' In that case the plaintiff purchased the exclusive right
to sell the face powder "Java" in the United States from the French
manufacturer of the powder. The defendant, an owner of a small drug
store, imported the genuine face powder from the French company and
began to sell it in competition with the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant was infringing on his United States registered trade-
mark. Properly grounded in the trademark theory of the time, the Sec-
ond Circuit denied protection to the plaintiff, holding:
Trade-marks . . . are intended to show without any time limit the
origin of the goods they mark, so that the owner and the public
may be protected against the sale of one man's goods as the goods
of another man. If the goods sold are the genuine goods covered by
the trade-mark, the rights of the owner of the trade-mark are not
infringed.2
Rejecting the circuit court's theory that the trademark "Java" in-
dicated only that the face powder came from the French company, the
Supreme Court reversed.' The Court held that the mark not only indi-
cated the source of the face powder as French, but that "[it is the
trade mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph C. Howard, United States District Court for
the District of Maryland; B.A. 1986, University of Washington; J.D. 1989, University
of Maryland School of Law.
1. 275 F. 539 (2nd Cir. 1921).
2. Id. at 543 (emphasis added). This decision is based on the "source theory" of
trademarks which regards the purpose of trademarks solely to protect the consumer
from counterfeits. In Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18, 20 (1886), the court held:
There is no exclusive right to a name or symbol or emblematic device except to
denote the authenticity of the article with which it has become identified by associ-
ation. The name has no office except to vouch for the genuineness of the thing
which it distinguishes from all counterfeits; and until it is sought to be used as a
false token to denote that the product or commodity to which it is applied is the
product or commodity which it properly authenticates, the law of trade-mark can-
not be invoked.
3. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
(21)
22 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come
from the plaintiff although not made by it."' 4 In addition, the Court
considered a trademark's purpose as more than denoting source, but
also as a valuable asset of the plaintiff's business.5 Trademark rights
are "a delicate matter that may be of great value but that [are] easily.
. . destroyed, and therefore should be protected with corresponding
care."' The value of a trademark was identified by the Supreme Court
as the good will of plaintiff's business as well as the "reputation he
stakes upon the character of the goods."'
Not only the Supreme Court, but also Congress, recognized the
inequities involved in denying Bourjois & Co. protection for the rights
it purchased from the French manufacturer. Following the Court's de-
cision in Katzel, Congress enacted § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922,
later reenacted as § 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930.8 This statute
prohibits the importation into the United States of any merchandise:
[1] of foreign manufacture ... [2] bearing a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within ... the United States, [3] and registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States ...
[4] unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is pro-
duced at the time of making entry.9
Thus, a business finding itself in the position of Bourjois & Co. is
now, at least ostensibly, afforded protection not only by the Supreme
Court's decision in Katzel, but also by federal statute.
The Customs Service regulations implementing § 526, however,
have not extended this protection to all situations. Specifically, there is
no § 526 bar to the importation of articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are
owned by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are
parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to com-
4. Id. at 692.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Codified as 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). This statute was characterized as a
"hastily drafted provision" and "introduced as a 'midnight amendmen[t]' on the floor
of the Senate." K Mart Corp. V. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 303 (1988).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1526
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mon ownership or control;1" [or]
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark
or trade name applied under a-uthorization of the U.S. owner .... 1
It is these three exceptions to the protection of § 526 that were
challenged in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 2 with the Supreme Court
upholding exceptions (1) and (2) (the "common control" exception) as
permissible regulatory interpretations of § 526, but striking down ex-
ception (3) (the "authorized use" exception)."3
II.
An association of United States trademark holders, the Coalition
to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks,"' brought suit seek-
ing a mandatory order directing the Customs Service, contrary to its
regulations interpreting § 526, to exclude all gray market goods from
entry into the United States. 5 The district court judge upheld the reg-
ulations."6 Holding that the "pivotal question" is whether the construc-
tion of § 526 by the Customs Service is "sufficiently reasonable" to be
accepted by the reviewing court,' 7 the court found reasonableness based
upon:
[T]he legislative history, judicial decisions, legislative acquiescence,
and the long-standing consistent policy of the Customs Service. The
regulations clearly implement the limited purpose for which Section
526 was enacted and are consistent with and effectuate the intent
of Congress to permit entry of trademarked goods not involving the
10. 19 C.F.R. 133.2(d) (1987) provides definitions for this subsection. " 'Common
ownership' means individual or aggregate ownership of more than 50 percent of the
business entity, and ... '[clommon control' means effective control in policy and opera-
tions and is not necessarily synonymous with common ownership."
11. 19 C.F.R. 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987).
12. K Mart, 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
13. Id. at 287.
14. Members of this association are manufacturers or distributors of products
such as fragrances and cosmetics, watches, tires, fine crystal, cameras, photographic
equipment, binoculars and electronic goods. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks v. United States, 598 F.Supp 844, 846 (D.C. 1984).
15. Id. The Supreme Court defined gray market goods as "a foreign-manufac-
tured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the con-
sent of the U.S. trademark holder." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. at 285.
16. Coalition to Preserve, 598 F.Supp at 852.
17. Id. at 851.
1990]
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Katzel situation.' 8
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court "mis-
apprehended the doctrine of deference to an agency interpretation of its
governing statute,"' 9 and that the Customs Service regulations "cannot
be squared with Section 526 and are thus invalid."20 The court of ap-
peals based its opinion on the Supreme Court's decision in Katzel,
which emphasized that trademark law is intended not only to guard
against public deception, but also to protect property rights."
Noting this decision, the court of appeals held that Congress "sim-
ilarly rejected without qualification the legal theory underlying the
Second Circuit's opinion in Katzel - the view that a trademark genuine
in a foreign country is necessarily genuine here as well - and enshrined
the alternative 'territoriality' approach into law."22 The Customs Ser-
vice regulations, therefore, conflicted with Congress' intent to reject the
Second Circuit's legal theory of trademark protection, and the court
struck down the regulations.23
Furthermore, the court held that even if § 526 were ambiguous,
the Customs Service's interpretation did not display the consistency
requisite for judicial acceptance.24 The regulations were not adopted
contemporaneously with the statute, were supported only by "poorly
articulated and vacillating reasoning," and were inconsistent.2 5
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in part and re-
versed in part.26 One majority concluded that exceptions (1) and (2)
18. Id. at 852.
19. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
20. Id. at 907.
21. Id. at 909-10.
22. Id. at 910. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 905. The court continued that if "the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter .... ." Id. at 908 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
24. Id. at 916.
25. Id. at 916-17.
26. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1988). This decision on the merits
followed a decision announced in March of 1988 which decided the question of juris-
diction only. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 176 (1988). In that decision the major-
ity held that the district court had jurisdiction under both the federal question provi-
sion, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the statute permitting jurisdiction over acts of Congress
relating to trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). The minority was of the opinion that
jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the Court of International Trade for suits over em-
bargoes and other restrictions on the importation of merchandise pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(3). The merits were not considered in the March decision, most likely, in
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created by the Customs Service could stand as a permissible construc-
tion of Congress' intent when enacting § 526,27 while a second majority
concluded that exception (3) could not be permitted to stand. 28
Justice Kennedy began the Court's opinion with an explanation of
the typical situations in which gray markets are formed. First, there is
the situation presented in Katzel involving an American company
which purchases from an unaffiliated foreign company the exclusive
right to use the foreign company's trademark and sell its trademarked
good in the United States (case 1).19 If the foreign company or a third
party begins to sell the trademarked good in competition with the
holder of the American sales rights, a gray market is formed.
The second situation involves an American company which regis-
ters a trademark in the United States for goods that are manufactured
by a related company in a foreign country (case 2).30 This situation
may involve a foreign manufacturer creating a United States subsidi-
ary which subsequently registers the trademark in order to control
United States distribution (case 2a).31 Two other possible variations are
created when an American company creates a manufacturing subsidi-
ary in another country (case 2b), or its own unincorporated but affili-
ated manufacturing division in a foreign nation (case 2c).32
Finally, a third situation which creates a gray market occurs when
the owner of an American trademark authorizes a foreign manufac-
turer to use its trademark (case 3).33 The foreign manufacturer is inde-
pendent of the American company and often the authorization contains
a condition that the manufacturer may not import the product into the
United States. The agreement, however, does not stop third parties
from purchasing the product from the foreign manufacturer and subse-
quently importing it into the United States.
In order to determine whether the Customs Service regulations
order to allow Justice Kennedy the opportunity to break a four to four deadlock created
by the vacancy on the Court. In fact, the Court's opinion on the merits consists of two
majority opinions written by Justice Kennedy with the concurring opinions of the
others. See infra notes 27-28 and 125-27 and accompanying text.
27. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 284. The majority included Justice Kennedy, with Jus-
tices White, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens concurring.
28. Id. This majority consisted of Justice Kennedy, with Justices Scalia, Black-
mun, O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist
concurring.
29. Id. at 286.
30. Id.
31. id.
32. Id. at 286-287.
33. Id.
19901
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were valid, the Court held that the "reviewing court must first deter-
mine if [the Customs Service] regulation is consistent with the lan-
guage of the statute. ' 34 "If the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue addressed by the regulation, the question
becomes whether the agency regulation is a permissible construction of
the statute."3 5
A.
The Court held that § 526 was ambiguous when applied to the
three variations of case 2. An ambiguity is created in case 2a because
the language "bearing a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a cor-
poration or association created or organized within .. . the United
States . . . " does not make it clear which company owns the United
States trademark. On one hand it could be argued that the foreign par-
ent, which owns the American subsidiary also owns the trademark, in
which case the protections provided in § 526 do not apply. On the other
hand it could be argued that it is the American company which owns
the trademark regardless of who owns the American company, and
therefore the protections of § 526 should apply.36
The Court found a second ambiguity in the phrase "merchandise
of foreign manufacture. '37 When applied to the situations involved in
cases 2b and 2c, it is possible to interpret "merchandise of foreign man-
ufacture" to mean "goods manufactured in a foreign country"'38 in
which case protection would be granted. But the phrase can also be
read to mean "goods manufactured by a foreign company"3 9 in which
case § 526 would apply only if the foreign subsidiary or unincorporated
division were considered to be foreign, even though actually owned by
an American company.
The Customs Service regulations contained in subsections (1) and
(2) resolve these ambiguities by removing the protection of § 526
whenever the companies involved are under common control. Thus, a
foreign parent in case 2a is considered to own the trademark and is not
permitted to prohibit the entry of the genuine product. In cases 2b and
2c similar products manufactured by companies abroad are not consid-
34. Id. at 291.
35. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
36. Id. at 292.
37. Id. Only Justice White joined in this particular portion of the opinion.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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ered to be foreign due to the affiliation or actual ownership involved by
an American parent.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, con-
curred that § 526 was not intended to extend to subsidiaries of foreign
parents, emphasizing the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the statute. "The most blatant hint that Congress did not intend to
extend § 526's protection to affiliates of foreign manufactures (case 2)
is the provision's protectionist, almost jingoistic flavor. Its structure be-
speaks an intent, characteristic of the times, to protect only domestic
interests." ' A foreign manufacturer cannot invoke § 526 for protection
unless it first registers the trademark with the Patent and Trademark
Office.4 ' But even that is not enough to gain the benefit of § 526 be-
cause the trademark must be owned by a citizen or corporation of the
United States.42
The barriers that Congress erected seem calculated to serve no
purpose other than to reserve exclusively to domestic, not foreign, inter-
ests the extraordinary protection that § 526 provides. But they are
fragile barriers indeed if a foreign manufacturer might bypass them by
the simple device of incorporating a shell domestic subsidiary and
transferring to it a single asset - the U.S. trademark. 3
Because a reading conferring § 526's protection to a shell subsidi-
ary would make most of the limiting language "pointless," 44 Brennan
agreed with Justice Kennedy that the Customs Service regulations rea-
sonably avoid this anomaly. 5 In addition, the concurring Justices held
that it is the parent corporation and "not the subsidiary whose every
decision it controls [that] better fits the bill as the true owner of any
property that the subsidiary nominally possesses." '48
Brennan also concurred in his opinion that § 526 is ambiguous
with regard to the requirement that merchandise be "of foreign manu-
facture."47 This requirement is vague because the phrase could be in-
terpreted to mean either "'merchandise manufactured in a foreign
country' or 'merchandise manufactured by a foreigner.' Under the for-
mer definition, the merchandise manufactured abroad [by a domestic
firm's subsidiary] would fall into § 526's ban. Under the later defini-
40. Id. at 297.
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
42. Id.
43. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 298.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 299.
47. Id.
1990]
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tion, however, the coverage is not clear."4 Since the intent of Congress
was not to extend protection to foreign affiliates, the Customs Service
regulation reasonably resolves the ambiguity. 9
In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, characterized the majority's
reading of the phrase "of foreign manufacture" as "queer" and "not
merely unusual but inconceivable . . . ."I Scalia explained his dissatis-
faction with the majority's holding:
The statute excludes only merchandise "of foreign manufacture,"
which the majority says might mean "manufactured by a for-
eigner" rather that "manufactured in a foreign country." I think
not. Words, like syllables acquire meaning not in isolation but
within their context. While looking up the separate word "foreign"
in a dictionary might produce the reading the majority suggests,
that approach would also interpret the phrase "I have a foreign
object in my eye" as referring, perhaps, to something from Italy.
The phrase "of foreign manufacture" is a common usage, well un-
derstood to mean "manufactured abroad."'"
Thus, the dissent argued that § 526 is clear and unambiguous with
its language "of foreign manufacture" and the Customs Service regula-
tions may not be used to alter the intent of Congress. 2
Justice Kennedy, writing for a second majority consisting of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor and
Scalia, also held that the authorized use exception contained in subsec-
tion (c)(3) of the Customs Service regulation did not resolve any simi-
lar ambiguity.53 In the case of an unaffiliated company which autho-
rizes the use of its trademark, § 526 clearly allows protection of the
trademark from gray market imports. Therefore the regulation oper-
ates contrary to the Congressional intent of § 526 and must fall. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[u]nder no reasonable construction of the statu-
tory language can goods made in a foreign country by an independent
foreign manufacturer be removed from the purview of the statute." '54 In
48. Id.
49. Id. at 300.
50. Id. at 319.
51. Id.
52. See, Board of Governors, FRS, v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
368 (1986).
53. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 293.
54. Id. at 294.
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his concurrence, Brennan agreed with this result because in case 3 the
United States trademark holder "is unambiguously 'owned by' a U.S.
firm, and registered by a firm 'domiciled in the United States,' and the
goods sought to be imported are 'of foreign manufacture.'-55
B.
Even before the Court delivered its opinion on the merits, Justice
Scalia had identified the importance of the gray market issue. In the
decision of the jurisdictional issue,"6 Justice Scalia characterized the
gray market situation as one "which may have immediate and substan-
tial effects on the national economy . . . ."' Indeed, in contrasting the
jurisdictional question with the question raised on the merits, Justice
Scalia noted that the "gray-market question is of greater economic
importance." 58
The opinions on the merits also reflected the other Justices' recog-
nition that the issue presented to them was one of importance for busi-
ness, economics and international trade. Justice Kennedy began the
Court's opinion by describing the reality of how gray markets fit into
international commerce.59 The other justices either referred to the
"multi-billion dollar industry [which] has emerged around [gray mar-
ket merchandise], ' 1 0 or expressed concern for how the decision in this
case would be received by trade partners abroad."1
With these very practical economic considerations in mind, the
Court proceeded to resolve the questions presented based on the ambi-
guities of § 526 and the reasonableness of the Customs Service regula-
tions.62 Emphasis on the plain meaning of the statute and deference to
an agency's interpretation are the established means of resolving ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. 63 This method seems particularly un-
satisfactory in a case such as K Mart, however, when the ultimate deci-
sion has such a large impact on business and trade.
Instead of confining itself to a narrow reading of the statutory con-
struction rules, it would have been more appropriate for the Court in
55. Id. at 323.
56. K Mart Corporation v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 176 (1988).
57. Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. K Mart, 486 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1988).
60. Id. at 295.
61. Id. at 322.
62. Id. at 292.
63. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natuaral Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
1990]
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this case to have considered an analysis of how businessmen involved in
the gray market would be affected. The Court could have fairly in-
cluded economic considerations by broadly construing recent statutory
construction precedent. For example, in Bethesda Hospital Ass'n v.
Bowen,"' the Court held that in "ascertaining the plain meaning of the
statute, the Court must look to the particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."' 65
Building on this language, the Court might have considered that the
design of § 526 was to create certain protections and build trade barri-
ers.66 Because the purpose of the statute was to protect certain busi-
nesses, the Court could have appropriately based its opinion, at least in
part, on those business practices.
This approach would arguably place the Supreme Court in the
role of legislator. The Court is empowered, however, only to interpret
what Congress has written, not write the law itself. If Congress, in its
farther-reaching power, does not like the practical result of a court's
interpretation, it can overrule it by making the language of a statute
clearer. Indeed, Congress took this step after the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.67 A forceful argument for placing
Congress in this superior position vis-a-vis the courts is that only Con-
gress, and not judges, have the experience and resources necessary to
write the law.
Yet, when an issue of such practical and immediate importance is
decided, as in K Mart, it would seem impossible for the Supreme Court
to reach a decision without considering more than the ambiguity of a
statute and legislative history. Instead of parsing statutory language,
the Court, in this case, should have reviewed the alternatives to § 526
in the common law as well as extrinsic considerations for businessmen
in the gray market such as antitrust and contract law. Reference to
such considerations could have lead the Court to a more effective reso-
lution of the problem presented.
III.
The result of the Court's holding in K Mart denies the owners of
American trademarks who are affiliated with a foreign manufacturer
the protection of § 526. Although these commonly controlled entities
64. 485 U.S. 399 (1988)(quoted by the Court in K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 291).
65. 485 U.S. at 403-405 (emphasis added).
66. One concurring opinion, in fact, did consider this at length. See K Mart, 486
U.S. at 295-96 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
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may not use the legislation to bar importation, they are not without
protection from gray market competition.68 In addition, the apparent
windfall given to companies which have authorized the use of their
marks can be abused: The prohibition on importation created by § 526
may lead to a successful challenge based on contract principles or anti-
trust laws.
A.
Alternatives available to the commonly controlled companies for
protection from gray market competition fall into two broad areas.
First, there are tort remedies such as unfair competition and intentional
interference with contractual relations; second, there are state and fed-
eral laws which may provide relief.
The tort of unfair competition in its narrowest sense prohibits the
"palming off [of] one's goods as those of a rival trader." 9 This concept,
combined with the Supreme Court's notion in Katzel that the Ameri-
can seller adds something to an imported good,"0 could permit an
American company to argue that gray market imports are being
palmed off as the product of another American company usually asso-
ciated with the domestic sale of the imported item. Furthermore, unfair
competition has been based on acts "which lie outside the ordinary
course of business and are tainted by fraud, or coercion, or conduct
otherwise prohibited by law."7 It is relatively easy to characterize one
who imports goods on the gray market as engaging in conduct tainted
68. To support its decision to deny the protection of § 526 to affiliated companies,
the Court suggested that the holder of a United States trademark could protect itself
from gray market competition in one of three ways:
They could, for example, jointly decide in their mutual best interests that the man-
ufacturer (1) should not import directly to any domestic purchaser other than its
affiliate; (2) should, if legal, impose a restriction against resale (or against resale
in the United States) as a condition on its sales abroad to potential parallel im-
porters; or (3) should curtail sales abroad entirely.
K Mart, 486 U.S. at 302. The first solution suggested will hardly be effective, as the
dissent pointed out, because "the bulk of the gray market is attributable to third par-
ties that are unaffiliated with either the manufacturer or the trademark holder." Id. at
328. The third solution to curtail sales abroad entirely is not really a solution to the
problem of gray market goods, because it simply avoids the creation of a gray market.
The second suggestion, as well, may not be viable. Even the Court as it made this
suggestion was careful to qualify itself with the crucial phrase "if legal." See infra
notes 115-24 and text accompanying.
69. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935).
70. See supra notes 3-7 and text as well as infra notes 80-88 and text.
71. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935).
1990]
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by fraud, especially when the consumers are intentionally left ignorant
of the true source and circumstances of the importation.
In the case of William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2 the
Supreme Court found unfair competition in a set of facts very likely to
occur in the gray market context. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of
a liquid preparation of quinine which was mixed with chocolate in or-
der to create a distinctive color and flavor." An affiliate of the defend-
ant began manufacturing a similar product 4 and Lilly not only sold it
at a lower price but "induc[ed] the purchasing druggist in his own in-
terest to substitute, as well as he could, the [cheaper imitation] for the
[more expensive original]. In other words, [the defendant] sought to
avail itself of the favorable repute which had been established for [the
plaintiff's] preparation in order to sell its own." 75
The Court held that there was no deception, and therefore no un-
fair competition with regard to the sales to the druggists because the
sales involved clearly distinguishing labels .7  The sales to the actual
consumers, however, usually did involve fraud, and the Court held the
defendant liable for the palming off, even though it only sold directly to
the druggists.7 7 "That no deception was practiced [by defendant] on
the retail dealers, and that they knew exactly what they were getting is
of no consequence. The wrong was in designedly enabling the dealers to
palm off the preparation as that of the [plaintiff]. ' '7" This theory of
liability may be of use against an importer of gray goods who sells to a
retailer, with the retailer subsequently palming off the goods as origi-
nally coming from the United States trademark owner. 9
72. 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
73. Id. at 527-529.
74. The actual manufacturer was the Pfeiffer Chemical Company and the Searle
& Hereth Company, both of which were commonly controlled with the defendant Eli
Lilly & Company which actually sold the product. Id. at 527.
75. Id. at 529-30.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. "One who induces another to commit a fraud and furnished the means of
consummating it is equally guilty and liable for the injury." Id.
79. Another case that may prove to be a useful analogy to the gray market goods
situation is Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916). The Supreme
Court's analysis may prove significant because Hanover Milling Co. involved a party
who misled consumers with similar packaging to an existing trademark, even though
the party engaging in the deception was using the trademark lawfully. Id. at 424. The
Court found unfair competition, notwithstanding the lack of infringing use, based on
the defendant's purpose of taking advantage of the plaintiff's advertising and reputa-
tion. Id. at 423. A less obvious use of the Hanover Milling Co. case may be made by
the gray market importer. Hanover Milling Co. established that common law trade-
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Finally, there is an old Eighth Circuit case which found unfair
competition in a case directly on point: Perry v. American Hecolite
Denture Corp.80 Plaintiff, the American Hecolite Denture Corporation,
received by assignment all United States rights to sell denture blanks
manufactured by the German Hecolite company. Defendant purchased
denture blanks manufactured by German Hecolite, as did the plaintiff,
from retailers in Germany and imported them into the United States.
When defendant sold the blanks, he represented only that they were
the original denture blanks manufactured by German Hecolite.8 '
Analyzing these facts, the court held that "it was incumbent on
plaintiff to show that [defendant] had 'palmed off his blanks as those of
the plaintiff'; that he was guilty of 'passing off' as it is called in the
English law books."82 The court found that plaintiff became associated
with the name Hecolite in the United States because he sold the den-
ture'blanks "in [a] distinctive little green box, [and] vouched for and
replaced [the product] whenever complained against . . .. , Ameri-
cans had come to expect the plaintiff's product when Hecolite was of-
fered. Despite the fact the products were identical, the court held that
the defendant was attempting to sell on the plaintiff's reputation and
standing.84
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Katzel, as well as Eng-
lish cases "in accord with our own decisions," 85 the court considered it
settled that "an exclusive sales agent of foreign made trade-marked
goods may so carry on his business of selling the goods in the country
of import as to there create public understanding that the goods have
come from him, though not made by him."86 Because a domestic re-
tailer can become known as the source for a foreign manufactured
item, the court found an appropriate test for unfair competition to be:
[W]hat, if anything, [is there] to identify the [U.S.] agent with the
mark rights may not create a monopoly in markets or regions to which the mark's
trade has never reached. Id. at 419. Due to the legitimacy of both marks involved in
Hanover Milling Co., and the legitimacy, or at least genuiness, of a gray market trade-
mark, an importer might successfully argue that as long as the United States trade-
mark owner is not selling or advertising in a particular region, the gray market im-
porter is permitted to do so.
80. 78 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1935).
81. Id. at 561.
82. Id. at 559 (citing Schechter, Warner and Hanover Milling Co.).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 560.
86. Id.
1990]
34 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
articles dealt in by him which was used to induce the purchaser to
buy them; "what, if any, peculiar feature whether in get-up or
shape or whatever it may be." Was there anything about the goods
which by way of get-up says to the purchaser: "This is a thing for
which (the [U.S.] sales agents) are responsible, not necessarily as
makers, but as persons who have dealt in it and who guarantee its
quality to you. "87
If there is such a peculiar feature to a good, then an importer has
no "right to sell in such a way or under such circumstances as to in-
duce belief or trade upon the understanding that the [goods come]
from the [U.S. agent] or they are identical to those sold by the [U.S.
agent] .88 In the gray market goods context, therefore, a feature pecu-
liar only to the United States trademark and creating public under-
standing that the goods come from the American trader, would warrant
protection.
A second common law cause of action, in addition to unfair com-
petition, is intentional interference with contractual relations. This tort
is only loosely, and often mistakenly used by the courts, but it is a
viable cause of action.8 9 In addition to the courts which have made
actual use of it, the Restatement (Second) Torts has adopted this tort
and stated its elements clearly:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the perform-
ance of contract ... between another and a third person by induc-
ing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the con-
tract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss
resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to per-
form the contract.90
A domestic parent may take advantage of this tort by having its
foreign affiliate enter into a contract providing that the affiliate will not
sell the trademarked goods in the United States, as well as not sell the
goods to a third party who intends to import the goods into the United
States. If a third party should purchase the product from the foreign
company and subsequently attempt to sell it in the United States, no
87. Id. at 560-61.
88. Id. at 561.
89. See e.g., DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d. 621 (2nd Cir. 1980).
90. 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 766 (1977). Compare with RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) TORTS § 766C providing that there is no liability for the negligent
interference with contractual relations.
K MART v. CARTIER
protection is available from § 526 due to the Customs Service's com-
mon control exception, but the Restatement alternative offers a cause
of action for relief.91 The American trademark owner would argue that
the gray market importer caused the foreign affiliate to breach its con-
tract regarding resale, and therefore the importer is subject to liability
"for the pecuniary loss resulting to the [American company] from the
failure of the [foreign firm] to perform the contract." '92 This argument
has found some support in the courts.93
In DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co.,94 the plaintiff had been ap-
pointed the exclusive United States dealer of soap manufactured under
the trademark "Pears." 95 Defendant purchased the soap from a Euro-
pean middleman and sold it in the United States at a lower price than
the plaintiff. 6 Relying on the Restatement (Second) Torts and New
York state common law, the Second Circuit suggested the plaintiff had
a cause of action based upon a theory of intentional interference with
contract relations.97 The suit's basis would have been the defendant's
interference with plaintiff's enjoyment of his exclusive distribution
contract.
98
Commonly controlled companies may also be able to protect them-
selves from gray market competition through various state and federal
statutes. For example, the Unfair Import Practices Chapter of the
Trade Act of 19749 declares unlawful:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles in the United States, or in their sale by the owner, im-
porter, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which
is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and eco-
nomically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the estab-
lishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and
91. With regard to the knowledge requirement, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 766 comment i (1977) provides that "to be subject to liability under the rule
stated in this Section, the actor must have knowledge of the contract with which he is
interfering and of the fact that he is interfering with the performance of the contract
(emphasis added).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 766 (1977).
93. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
94. 622 F.2d 621 (2nd Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 621.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 624.
98. Id.
99. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
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commerce in the United States .... '00
If a violation is found, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to
exclude the articles from entry into the United States."'
There are also two common state laws that could be invoked to
provide protection from gray market competition: anti-dilution and un-
fair competition statutes. A typical anti-dilution statute provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the dis-
tinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for in-
junctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or not
registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of competition between the parties or the absence of confu-
sion as to the source of goods or services.' 02
This statute would allow an American company harmed by gray
market goods to argue that the distinctive quality of its mark, perhaps
as the only American distributor of a foreign item, has been lost due to
the gray market imports. Therefore, an injunction prohibiting the gray
goods would be appropriate. Furthermore, if the gray goods are in some
way inferior, the domestic trademark owner could argue that an in-
junction is an appropriate remedy due to the tarnished association con-
sumers have developed due to the deception caused by the gray goods.
Even a blurring of the domestic trademark owner's identity as the "offi-
cial" domestic source of the foreign import would be enough for a
cause of action pursuant to most anti-dilution statutes."°3
State unfair trade practice legislation generally codifies and re-
peats most of the common law protections mentioned above. For exam-
100. Id. § 1337(a).
101. Id. § 1337(d), (e) and (f). Similar relief may be granted as well by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission pursuant to its power granted by 15 U.S.C. § 45 to prohibit
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1)
(1988).
Another applicable federal statute is the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988),
which prohibits the use in commerce of any "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colora-
ble imitation of a registered mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988). Due to differences in
warranty provisions and servicing arrangements, in addition to the theory announced
by the Supreme Court in Katzel, this may prove to be a convincing argument. See
supra notes 3-7 and 80-88 as well as accompanying text.
102. N.Y. General Business Law § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
103. An anti-dilution statute, even if available, will not be easy to use. Courts are
unfriendly to these statutes and will only enforce them to a limited extent when the
mark is distinctive. See, e.g., J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE §
5.05[91 (1988).
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pie, Maryland's unfair or deceptive trade practices statute prohibits,
among other activities, "[flalse, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral
or written statements, visual description, or other representation of any
kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or mis-
"1104leading consumers ....
B.
If a company wishing to avoid the uncertainties of alternative rem-
edies decides not to affiliate itself too closely with a company abroad
and avail itself of the protection of § 526 for authorized use such as in
case 3, there still may be legal barriers to surmount. Agreements au-
thorizing a foreign manufacturer to use a trademark will usually con-
tain a provision limiting the sale of the manufactured item to foreign
countries and prohibiting its sale in the United States. Such contracts
may also limit third parties to whom the authorized manufacturer may
sell the goods; namely not to anyone for the purpose of subsequent im-
portation into the United States. These restrictive agreements are an
obvious target for a suit alleging antitrust violations." 5 Antitrust viola-
tions notwithstanding, however, it is questionable whether courts will
uphold contracts containing these types of restrictions.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States0 6 involved an action
charging antitrust violations against an American company which al-
legedly combined with its related companies in France and Britain.
These three companies signed agreements which provided for, among
other things, the allocation of world-wide trade territories among the
companies," 7 cooperation to protect each other's markets and eliminate
outside competition,108 and participation in cartels to restrict imports
to, and exports from, the United States.10 9 Arguing on appeal that the
district court erred in its determination that the Sherman Act antitrust
laws were violated, Timken contended that the restraints on trade re-
lied on by the lower court were reasonable, and therefore not in viola-
104. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(1) (1983).
105. A company wishing to authorize the use of its trademark abroad may, of
course, simply not include any restrictions on resale at all. When a gray market import
reaches United States Customs, § 526 will deny entry. Relying on the Customs Service
and waiting for the infringing goods to enter the country may not, however, provide
much peace of mind for the businessman making a substantial investment, and the
contract provisions are an obvious place to make certain of protection.
106. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
107. Id. at 596.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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tion of the antitrust laws, because they were "an exercise of Timken's
right to license the trademark 'Timken.' "110
The Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument. The
Court first indicated that the American Timken company was possibly
precluded from making this argument because it might not be the
owner of the trademark for the British and French corporations."' As-
suming American Timken was the owner, however, the Court held that
a "trademark cannot be legally used as device for Sherman Act viola-
tion."' 2 The Court found that the agreements "went far beyond pro-
tection of the mark 'Timken' and provided for control of the manufac-
ture and sale of [the goods] whether carrying the mark or not."' 3
Timken therefore provides an indication that agreements authorizing
the use of a mark in certain geographical areas only, in order to allo-
cate trade territories, will not be favored by the courts and may violate
the Sherman Act."4
If antitrust law does not create a barrier to these agreements, they
may be held invalid as a matter of contract law." 5 The owner of a
trademarked good probably would want to restrict the manufacturer's
sale of a good in one of two ways. The most comprehensive method
would be a complete ban on the manufacturer from selling to a third
party when the third party is a potential gray market importer. A sec-
ond method would require that the subsequent sale of the good must be
at a certain minimum price." 6 In this way the trademark holder could
110. Id. at 597.
111. Id. at 599.
112. Id. at 599. The Court supported this proposition by noting that the Trade-
mark Act itself penalizes the use of a mark "to violate the antitrust laws of the United
States." Id. (citing 60 Stat. 427, 439, § 33(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1115(b)(7)
(1988)). ("The reason for the penalty provision was that 'trade-marks have been mis-
used . . . [and] have been used in connection with cartel agreements.' 92 Cong. Rec.
7872." Timken, 341 U.S. at 599 n.8).
113. Id. at 598-99.
114. See Timken at 598. ("[Timken's] premise that the trade restraints are only
incidental to the trademark contracts is refuted by the District Court's finding that the
'trade mark provisions [in the agreements] were subsidiary and secondary to the cen-
tral purpose of allocating trade territories.' " (brackets in original)).
115. The grounds a court would use to strike down such a contract would be
broad public policy considerations based on illegal bargaining, judicial hostility to mo-
nopolies and analogies to the antitrust laws. As such, the analysis of contract law is
related to the antitrust problem above.
116. This involves the sale of an article where the sale contains an agreement
fixing the resale price. A trademark owner wishing to limit gray market competition
might require the resale price to be the same or a certain percentage higher than the
price of the authorized article.
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require that the gray market imports be sold at a price high enough to
prevent competition with the authorized goods.
The comprehensive ban on all resale to potential gray market im-
porters would not be enforced by the courts. "Under ordinary circum-
stances, the 'owner' of an article has a complete 'monopoly' in its use
and enjoyment."11 The owner has absolute discretion to sell or refuse
to sell to a potential gray market importer. But, once the owner has
made a sale, his exclusive rights are gone, including his power to refuse
to sell to a gray market importer."' Neither will a notice attached to
the article stating that the article may not be imported into the United
States be an effective remedy. "If the seller firmly fastens to the article
a notice that there shall be no resale . . . for other than a specified use,
the notice is wholly inoperative as a control over subsequent owners."11"9
The second method of using a resale price maintenance agree-
ment 20 may be a viable alternative. Fair trade laws, enacted in some
form by almost every state, and contained in some federal legislation,
make these agreements enforceable.' 2 ' The underlying theory of these
statutes is that they are only used by producers of an article that is
uniform and can be identified by a trademark. 22 "Its use in no way
suppresses the competition of other similar articles with the identified
articles, either by other producers [or retailers]. An unreasonable high
price will cause consumers to buy competing articles instead and thus
decrease the seller's total profits."12 3 A producer may use these resale
agreements to restrain competition because he is only limiting the com-
petition of a good in which he already has exclusive ownership.
The use of uniformity and identification as the key to permitting
this type of monopoly suggests that they may not be appropriate in the
gray market context. The fact that the gray market exists indicates
that there is indeed actual competition between retailers of an identifi-
able good. A resale price agreement may not be permitted in this con-
text because it would create a monopoly which otherwise would not
exist. This is consistent with Corbin's conclusion that these statutes "do
not protect persons who use resale price maintenance agreements for
the purpose or the effect of obtaining a monopoly that will eliminate
117. A. CORBIN, 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1408, at 227 (1962).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 228.
120. See supra note 116.
121. CORBIN at 234.
122. Id. at 228.
123. Id.
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competition with their products."' 24
IV.
By allowing the exception for commonly controlled or owned com-
panies to stand, one majority of the Supreme Court encourages interna-
tional competition and free trade across borders. Without the protec-
tion of § 526, some companies will not receive a monopoly in the sale of
trademarked goods in the United States which could be used to fix
higher prices for American consumers. Whatever harm the United
States owners of trademarks may claim due to the Court's holding can
be mitigated by alternatives to § 526 such as various statutes and tort
theories.
The second majority in K Mart struck down the authorized use
exception to § 526. The effect of this holding is to protect American
businessmen from competition in the American companies' own trade-
marked goods. The same activity of a gray market importer, if done by
a domestic firm authorized to use a trademark for manufacturing,
would constitute a trademark infringement. The Supreme Court has
simply provided analogous protection in the case of a foreign manufac-
turer authorized to use the trademark. Additionally, this majority pre-
vents a gray market importer from being unjustly enriched by the
American trademark holder's advertising expenses, good will, and en-
trepreneurial skill. Protecting the exclusive rights of an owner of a
United States trademark also benefits American consumers by giving
them the assurance that the trademarked goods they purchase have a
consistent source and quality. This protection, however, if abused, is
limited by antitrust and contract law.
The approaches of the two majorities, in terms of trade policy and
the effect on international commerce, are inconsistent. The Court's
overall holding, however, is consistent with modern statutory construc-
tion jurisprudence. 125 Perhaps the actual disagreement between the two
majorities goes not to ambiguities and statutory construction so much
as to where the line should be drawn between international free trade
on one side, and protection of American business investments on the
other. 126 If this is true, the Court's compromise, even though difficult to
124. Id. at 235.
125. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 284 (1988) (Part II A of Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion discusses the standard of review for agency regulations and
supra notes 62-63 and text).
126. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Justice Kennedy's terse opinion
for the majorities, focusing only on the language and intent of the statute and regula-
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reconcile with regard to trade policy, at least does not create an undue
burden on international businessmen.
tions was joined only by Justice White, and then only for one section. Id. The other
justices and the Chief Justice all wrote or joined concurring opinions indicating that
their interest was in much more than simple statutory construction.
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